Headline: Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson Makes Herself Heard, Prompting a Rebuke
Sub-headline: In solo dissents this term, the justice accused the conservative majority of lawless bias. On the term’s last day, Justice Amy Coney Barrett fired back.
Editor: The first paragraphs of Adam Liptak scolding chatter? Steeped in animus toward the newist member of the Court, is unsurprising, this is The New York Times!
Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson wrote just five majority opinions in the Supreme Court term that ended last month, the fewest of any member of the court. But her voice resonated nonetheless, in an unusually large number of concurring and dissenting opinions, more than 20 in all.
Several of them warned that the court was taking lawless shortcuts, placing a judicial thumb on the scale in favor of President Trump and putting American democracy in peril. She called the majority’s opinion in the blockbuster case involving birthright citizenship, issued on the final day of the term, “an existential threat to the rule of law.”
Justice Jackson, 54, is the court’s newest member, having just concluded her third term. Other justices have said it took them years to find their footing, but Justice Jackson, the first Black woman to serve on the court, quickly emerged as a forceful critic of her conservative colleagues and, lately, their approach to the Trump agenda.
Her opinions, sometimes joined by no other justice, have been the subject of scornful criticism from the right and have raised questions about her relationships with her fellow justices, including the other two members of its liberal wing.
Editor: In sum Justice Jackson has overstepped the bounds of deference to the senior members of the Court?
The History of the Neo-Confederate Supreme Court is well Documented, and its holdovers
On Wednesday, the five partisan Republicans on the U.S. Supreme Court showed that they wanted to do their part in devaluing the votes of blacks, Hispanics, Asian-Americans and young urban whites. So the key GOP justices indicated during oral arguments that they are looking for excuses to strike down the heart of the Voting Rights Act.
Right-wing Justice Antonin Scalia shocked the courtroom when he dismissed the Voting Rights Act as a “perpetuation of racial entitlement,” suggesting that the right of blacks to vote was some kind of government handout.
But almost as troubling was the remark from Justice Anthony Kennedy who insisted that the Voting Rights Act, which was first enacted by Congress in 1965 and was renewed overwhelmingly in 2006, was an intrusion on Alabama as an “independent sovereign,” states’ rights language reminiscent of the Old Confederacy.
Indeed, the five Republican justices also including John Roberts, Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito seem to have absorbed a Neo-Confederate interpretation of the Constitution that is at odds with what the Framers intended.
Editor: Freighted with respectable bourgeois political chatter, here is the would-be ‘Bill of Attainder’ against Justice Jackson, confected by Liptak!
Justice Jackson, who did not respond to a request for comment, has also been a harsh critic of the court’s use of truncated procedures in ruling on emergency applications.
“This fly-by-night approach to the work of the Supreme Court is not only misguided,” she wrote in April, when the court said that Venezuelan men the administration was seeking to deport to El Salvador had sued in the wrong court. “It is also dangerous.”
In a dissent from an emergency ruling in June granting Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency access to sensitive Social Security data, Justice Jackson accused the majority of giving Mr. Trump favored treatment. “What would be an extraordinary request for everyone else,” she wrote, “is nothing more than an ordinary day on the docket for this administration.”
When the court let Mr. Trump lift humanitarian parole protections for more than 500,000 migrants in May, Justice Jackson wrote that the majority had “plainly botched” the analysis, “rendering constraints of law irrelevant and unleashing devastation.”
Justices Jackson and Sotomayor are the only members of the court who have served as trial judges. In the last term, Justice Jackson repeatedly criticized the majority for undermining the authority of their colleagues on the front lines.
In the dissent that prompted Justice Barrett’s rebuke, she decried the majority’s “dismissive treatment of the solemn duties and responsibilities of the lower courts.”
“Officials who use their public positions for private gain threaten the integrity of our most important institutions,” she wrote. “Greed makes governments — at every level — less responsive, less efficient and less trustworthy from the perspective of the communities they serve.”
Editor: How uttery inconveient for a sitting Justice of The Supreme Court , Justice Jackson, to remind the other members of the Court, that she is capable of telling critical evaliations of their corrupt practises?
Political Observer.
Editor: David Sypher Jr.
Ketanji Jackson pushes ideology over the Constitution
Dissent is a sacred tool, not a soapbox.
Thursday, July 10, 2025
When a Supreme Court justice warns that the decisions of her colleagues pose an “existential threat to the rule of law,” it’s not just a legal disagreement – it’s a performance. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s recent dissents, particularly in Trump v. Casa, show a troubling shift in the role of a justice. Instead of offering careful counterpoints rooted in constitutional reasoning, she delivers ideological monologues that sound tailor-made for MSNBC clips and Essence Fest applause lines.
Editor: Who does David Sypher Jr. choose as his champion but the long dead Neo- Confederate Antonin Scalia! This assisted by ‘Even Justice Sotomayor’ that is supposed to represent what an actual ‘dissent might be’within respectable bourgouise bounds?
This isn’t a critique of dissent itself. Dissent is vital to the integrity of the Court. The late Antonin Scalia built an entire legacy on it – scorching in tone, yes, but always grounded in jurisprudence. Even Justice Sotomayor, who leans progressive, typically stays within the framework of legal analysis. But Jackson’s dissents feel different. They are often infused with the emotional urgency of a political stump speech rather than the deliberative tone of a judicial opinion. That’s not a matter of style – it’s a matter of purpose.
Editor: Should The Reader look to Korematsu v. United States (1944) and two dissents of Roberts
Korematsu v. United States (1944)
Summary
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) was a U.S. Supreme Court case that upheld Japanese internment camps. After the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066. Executive Order 9066 resulted in the eviction of thousands of Japanese American children, women, and men from restricted areas in the West Coast and held many of them in internment camps in order of preventing the occurrence of war crimes. Fear and uncertainty manifested among the general American public and the government from the attack. Congress and the Executive acted in response of the public’s concern and targeted individuals of Japanese ancestry as potential war threats. Living during the wartime tension, Fred Korematsu, a Japanese American, tried to live out of trouble. Korematsu would lie about his ethnicity and background saying he was Mexican American in order to avoid governmental exclusion. Korematsu didn’t escape the Executive Order 9066 when he refused to leave his home in San Leandro, California violating Exclusion Order Number 34.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Korematsu’s conviction resulting in him going to a Japanese internment camp. The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Black, justified their ruling by stating that Congress and the Executive have the right to issue military orders that evicted and placed individuals in internment camps based off their Japanese ancestry due to the fact that potential of espionage existing among Japanese Americans outweighed their constitutional rights. This case ruling has been regarded as one of the worst Supreme Court decisions made by many historians due to the lack of civil rights granted to Korematsu. After Korematsu v. United States, Korematsu’s conviction was reversed.
Timeline 1
Background
After the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 by Japanese military, Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 on February 16, 1942. The Executive Order allowed United States Military to transport individuals, implying those of Japanese ancestry, to live in designated and restricted areas and issued curfews for the latter group of individuals as a result of wartime prevention and protection. The order did not mention a particular group. It was mostly applied to the Japanese American population. The population was largely located on the West Coast. A Nisei Order was issued which meant that all U.S. born sons and daughters of Japanese immigrants of the southern California terminal island, were ordered to evacuate their homes only bringing what they could carry. After the Pearl Harbor attack, great hostility towards individuals of Japanese ancestry increased in fear of said individuals potentially being spies plotting another attack. The United States suffered immensely from the Pearl Harbor attack and many citizens were terrorized with the image of the attack. The United States President and Congress acted in response to the attack and the political attitude of the the nation’s fear of war and terror. A second executive order was issued on March 18, 1942. This executive order created the War Relocation Authority. This agency was responsible for speeding up the relocation process for Japanese relocation. The evacuees were sent to the Manzanar War relocation center. On May 3, 1942 Fred Korematsu was issued the Exclusion Order Number 34. Korematsu failed to submit to his relocation destination. Consequently, Korematsu was then arrested on May 30 and taken to Tanforan Relocation Center. He was convicted of violating a military order and received a five year probation sentence.
Procedural History
Korematsu appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. His appeal was denied citing that the case doubted whether or not it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
After being denied, Korematsu appealed to the Supreme Court.
On April 5, 1943 oral arguments were held.
On December 8, 1944 the United States supreme court delivered its opinion on the Korematsu case, upholding Korematsu’s conviction
On December 18, 1944 the U.S. supreme court handed down an Ex-Parte Endo, which the justices unanimously ruled that the U.S. government could not continue to detain a citizen who was “concededly loyal” to the United States.
Issues
Did the Presidential Executive Order 9066 violate Korematsu’s 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause and his 5th Amendment rights to ‘life, liberty, and property.”?
Korematsu felt that his rights were being violated. He felt that he was being deprived of his rights live freely without the appropriate legal process.
Did Congress go beyond its power by issuing an exclusion that deprived Japanese American of their rights?
Did the Presidential Executive Order 9066 violated habeas corpus?
Under a writ of habeas corpus, a person should be able to obtain relief from unlawful detention. However, Korematsu was denied this right.
Arguments by Petitioner (or Appellant or Plaintiff or Prosecution)
Korematsu believed the orders, proclamations, and congressional law were unconstitutional because these laws deprived Korematsu of his rights, the same rights to other citizens of the United States, without his 5th Amendment right to due process of the law.
The laws created by the government deprived Korematsu of equal protection of the law on the basis of racial discrimination. The Fifth Amendment’s due process clause protects individuals on the federal level. The Fourteenth Amendment applies to the state level. As a result, both the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment are the same. Korematsu believed there was an inconsistency with the application of both amendments because it is not fair that some amendments are applied to certain citizens in certain places when these amendments were created to protect every individual on every level. Korematsu believed the government’s new laws stemmed from racial prejudice not ‘military necessity’ which justified the internments.
The government ordered Korematsu to immediate deportation and internment without telling him the cause of his conviction, informing him of any accusations towards him, and without granting him the right to an impartial trial. Thus, Korematsu believed his Six Amendment rights were violated as well.
Arguments by Respondent (or Appellee or Defendant)
The Respondent believed that congressional law, proclamations, and executive orders done by the government were constitutional for the nature of the time, and they were valid exercise of the war power. Court precedent in Hirabayashi ruled that the unification of the president and Congress is enough to create “any substantial basis” to incorporate that a “protective measure is necessary to meet the threat of sabotage and espionage.”
A substantial basis exists to convey that individuals of Japanese ancestry, despite being born on United States soil, were affiliated and proud of Japan during the Pearl Harbor attack. To distinguish among Japanese Americans who weren’t proud for Japan and those who were was nearly impossible.
Decision
In a 6–3 ruling issued on December 18, the court upheld Korematsu’s conviction. The decision of the case written by justice Hugo Black, was related to a case in the previous year Hirabayashi v. United States. Both cases rested on the principle that deference to Congress and the military authorities, due to the recent events of the Pearl Harbor attack, Justice Hugo Black Stated it had to do with racism. In his Argument Korematsu was not excluded because of race or hostility; He was excluded because the United States was at war with japan and there was a fear of invasion along the west coast. Justice Hugo Black Believe proper security measures should be taken; congress should have the authority to do so.
Majority Opinion (Black)
Justice Hugo Black wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Stone, Reed, Douglas, Rutledge, and Frankfurter. Justice Black begins with stating that “that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.” Justice Black noted that the Court’s ruling was controversial because it authorized exclusionary orders towards individuals of Japanese ancestry. Yet, Justice Black justified the Court’s decision by stating “Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire….because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders–as inevitably it must– determined that they should have the power to do just this.” The decision was based off the necessary measures Congress and the Executive must make during war time. The threat of the possibility of the presence of espionage among Japanese ancestry outweighed Japanese Americans constitutional rights because of these war time measures. To this date, many historians critique Korematsu v. United States as one of the worst decisions made by the Supreme Court.
Concurring Opinion (Frankfurter)
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion that there is no evidence present in the Constitution that prohibits Congress from implementing valid military orders. Frankfurter believed that the Constitution can be interpreted in a way that Congress and the Executive have special powers to protect and defend the nation from imminent danger, such as war. Frankfurter states, “To find that the Constitution does not forbid the military measures now complained of does not carry with it approval of that which Congress and the Executive did. That is their business, not ours.” standing behind the military orders created by Congress and the Executive.
Dissenting Opinion (Jackson)
Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote a dissenting opinion where he expressed sentiments to reverse Korematsu’s conviction. Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion is regarded by many as one of the most influential opinions of a Supreme Court Justice because he believed Korematsu’s conviction was unconstitutional based off racial discrimination. Despite the tension existing during the time of Korematsu’s conviction, after the Pearl Harbor attack, Justice Jackson didn’t believe that Congress nor the Executive had the right to deprive Korematsu from his rights. His dissent is full of examples of how Japanese Americans do not hold a threat to the nation. One of his most famous quotes from his opinion is the following “Korematsu was born on our soil, of parents born in Japan. The Constitution makes him a citizen of the United States by nativity and a citizen of California by residence. No claim is made that he is not loyal to this country. There is no suggestion that apart from the matter involved here he is not law abiding and well disposed. Korematsu, however, has been convicted of an act not commonly a crime.” which clearly states how Korematsu, being an American citizen, was deprived of his rights based off his ancestry.
Dissenting Opinion (Murphy)
Justice Frank Murphy wrote a dissenting opinion remembered most by historians due to the passionate use of the racism. Justice Murphy found no justification for Korematsu’s conviction and immediately believed that his conviction should have been reversed. Justice Murphy believed that the military orders “legalized racism” because Korematsu was at no fault being in the presence of his home, and not being granted his right to an impartial trial. Not only was Justice Murphy in discontent with the lack of constitutional rights granted to Korematsu, but Justice Murphy was upset with the treatment of all Japanese in internment camps. He also highlighted the hypocrisy of the Court’s rule that such military actions outweigh an individual’s rights as these laws are upheld to the strict scrutiny standard. Justice Murphy states, “I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism. Racial discrimination in any form and in any degree has no justifiable part whatever in our democratic way of life. It is unattractive in any setting, but it is utterly revolting among a free people who have embraced the principles set forth in the Constitution of the United States.” believing that every American, despite external or internal circumstances, are entitled to their constitutional rights regardless of ancestry or external appearances because most Americans lineage stems from foreign lands.
Dissenting Opinion (Roberts)
Justice Owen Josephus Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that Korematsu’s conviction was unconstitutional because his loyalty to the United States wasn’t the reason why he was convicted. The reason Korematsu was convicted was solely due to his race. Also, Korematsu was excluded from his home for doing nothing. Justice Roberts, as the other dissenters believed Korematsu imposed no national threat to the country, and that him posing a threat wasn’t a true indicator to his conviction, which makes the conviction ultimately unconstitutional.
In Trump v. Casa, a case about whether the Biden administration could block a Trump-era executive order related to birthright citizenship, Jackson went far beyond dissent. She warned that the Court had opened the door to “uncontainable” executive power and “executive lawlessness,” claiming that this decision placed the very structure of American government at risk. If you’re wondering whether this sounds like a measured legal analysis or the script for a constitutional horror movie, you’re not alone.
Editor: The two dissents by Roberts in Korematsu, represent the possibility of impassiomed rhetoric, as a methhology to prick the consciousness of the reader/listener!
Justice Amy Coney Barrett, writing separately, took issue with the tone and lack of doctrinal clarity in Jackson’s dissent – and rightly so. Legal dissents, no matter how passionate, should be rooted in precedent, logic, and a serious engagement with the constitutional questions at hand. Jackson’s opinion reads more like a dire cable news commentary than a legal roadmap.
Editor: ‘Jackson’s opinion reads more like a dire cable news commentary than a legal roadmap’: I sum Jackson disturbs the quiet but unaddresses considerations laying fallow?
What’s even more telling is where Jackson chose to defend her approach: the Essence Festival in New Orleans, a culturally rich but highly political venue. In front of a friendly audience, she doubled down, saying the public needed to know the stakes and that “transparency strengthens democracy.” But there’s a difference between transparency and theatrics. When a Supreme Court justice positions herself as a political narrator warning the masses of institutional collapse, she’s no longer just interpreting the Constitution – she’s shaping the narrative.
Editor : ‘When a Supreme Court justice positions herself as a political narrator warning the masses of institutional collapse, she’s no longer just interpreting the Constitution – she’s shaping the narrative’The reader of this essay wonders at the very notion ‘of institutional collapse’ as the very definition of The Age of Trump?
This kind of rhetorical grandstanding might earn applause from progressive audiences, but it comes at a steep cost to the institution of the Court. Judicial authority is built on the perception of impartiality – on the idea that justices, even when they disagree, are operating from shared constitutional principles, not political tribes. When dissents are laced with catastrophic language designed to rally ideological bases, the public doesn’t just lose trust in one opinion – it starts to lose trust in the entire Court.
Editor: ‘Judicial authority is built on the perception of impartiality – on the idea that justices, even when they disagree, are operating from shared constitutional principles, not political tribes’ The reader confronts the inelutable fact that the Court is a Tribal Council!
It’s not as if Jackson is unaware of the effect she’s having. She noted in her public remarks that she authored twenty-four opinions this term – second only to Clarence Thomas – and spoke nearly 79,000 words during oral arguments. That’s not the resume of a quiet constitutionalist. It’s the profile of someone who understands the power of visibility and is using her platform as more than a legal mind – she’s becoming a political symbol.
Editor: ‘It’s the profile of someone who understands the power of visibility and is using her platform as more than a legal mind – she’s becoming a political symbol.’ In sum Jackson is an ‘Activist Judge’, though a term long abandoned but usable!
Of course, some will say this is exactly the point. That Jackson represents something bigger than the Court – that her voice is necessary to challenge what many see as a hard-right turn. But that’s precisely the problem. When a justice views the bench as a place to “challenge” the Court rather than serve on it, we’re no longer in the realm of law. We’re in the realm of ideology – and the robes are just set dressing.
Editor: ‘When a justice views the bench as a place to “challenge” the Court rather than serve on it, we’re no longer in the realm of law.’ See Roberts above for the propinquity between Law and Polotics!In the most incoveient terms terms Politics and The Law are bed-fellows?
There’s a troubling double standard at work here, too. Imagine if Justice Clarence Thomas, who rarely speaks publicly, suddenly took to conservative rallies to call liberal rulings an “existential threat” to the Constitution. The headlines would be endless. His impartiality would be questioned, and the legitimacy of the Court would be under fire. Yet when Jackson does it, it’s celebrated as “speaking truth to power.”
Editor: Justice Clarence Thomas is corrupt to his Neo-Confederate core!
The Court isn’t supposed to be a place for personal catharsis or political expression. It’s not Congress. It’s not a cable news roundtable. It’s the final guardian of the Constitution – a role that demands discipline, not dramatics. Dissent is a sacred tool, not a soapbox.
Editor: ‘Dissent is a sacred tool, not a soapbox’
Justice Jackson may see herself as a truth-teller in a time of crisis. But what the Court – and the country – needs is not louder dissents, but better ones. Ones that engage the law, not the emotions. Ones that respect the constitutional order rather than stage-manage its demise.
Editor: …the transformation of judges into pundits?
Because in the end, the greatest threat to the rule of law isn’t a conservative majority – it’s the transformation of judges into pundits.
Rootless cosmopolitan,down at heels intellectual;would be writer.
'Polemic is a discourse of conflict, whose effect depends on a delicate balance between the requirements of truth and the enticements of anger, the duty to argue and the zest to inflame. Its rhetoric allows, even enforces, a certain figurative licence. Like epitaphs in Johnson’s adage, it is not under oath.'
https://www.lrb.co.uk/v15/n20/perry-anderson/diary
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