Holy neurons- The Times Literary Supplement, January 21, 2011 p. 25

Review by Jonathan Benthall

Conceiving God

David Lewis-Williams

The cognitive origin and evolution of religion

320 pp. Thames and Hudson

‘Lewis –Williams and other militant atheists of liberal hue need to work harder to build a post-Darwinian system of ethics independent of religious underpinnings. An ambitious attempt has been made by Peter Singer, whose utilitarian philosophy seems intent on dethroning the Abrahamic principle of the sanctity of the individual; but disturbing questions present themselves. In the absence of an adherence to this principle of sanctity, and under economic pressures, what would be the outlook for patients in an advanced state of dementia or for severely brain-damaged children?  And if animals are included – according to Singer and consistently with Darwinism- as beneficiaries of utilitarian ethics, is there not a risk that respect for human rights will be diluted through a kind of inflation.’

Mr. Benthall makes a sweeping statement in the above paragraph: ‘ An ambitious attempt has been made by Peter Singer, whose utilitarian philosophy seems intent on dethroning the Abrahamic principle of the sanctity of the individual; but disturbing questions present themselves.’

One might ask the superficial question; what part does infant circumcision play in this asserted ‘Abrahamic principle of the sanctity of the individual’, in both Islam and Judaism? What part does the lack of consent play in ‘the sanctity of the individual’ or is submission to the will of the tribe an unexpressed good: or is the value of seeming moral conformity,the principle of highest value. What of the fate of the non-conformists in the midst of the believers: history most definitely answers that question, despite Mr. Benthall’s argument by assertion.

False Functions- The Times Literary Supplement, January 21, 2011 p. 28

Reviewed by Constance Sandis

Kinds Of  Reasons

An essay in the philosophy of action

240 pp. Oxford University Press

‘The central feature of Kinds of Reasons is a sustained effort to respond to a string of objections that have been raised against the sort of unifying view that Alvarez defends. One of the most popular challenges raises a question about the function of false beliefs. If actions are to be explained by reasons, it is argued , then these reasons had better be truths, and yet it seems we are often moved to act by false beliefs.  It is then concluded that reasons that explain actions are not facts about the world but psychological attitudes toward it, namely beliefs and/or desires.’

In the world of religions, how do we determine true from false beliefs?Is this question non-binding in the area of religious ideologies? Ms. Sandis raises interesting questions that are relevant to some of the fundamental questions in  the review of Mr. Benthall.

German Philosophy

1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism

Terry Pinkard

Page 151

‘Religion thus begins in the kind of self apprehension of which Holderlin and Novalis had spoken. Its mode of apprehension of this “one and all” is that of “intuition”; religion for Schleiermacher is thus a matter of the way the individual fundamentally sees the world, of the “picture” he has of it , how he, as Schleiermacher himself put it, “intuits” it.  Since this “intuition” is a “view”, a “picture” of where one does and even must stand in the greater scheme of things, it determines one’s ultimate standards of evaluation for belief , action or apprehension. One cannot thereby be argued either into or out of such a view, since the nature of that fundamental view is ultimately a practical, even existential matter of the kind of person one is and must be, not  of the kind of arguments one can muster for certain conclusions.’

Mr. Pinkard  in this paragraph and his chapter number six points toward Schleiermacher’s expressed belief and for me  this might just render null the annoying hubris and triumphalism of the ‘religious’ by focusing upon the fundamental ‘view’ of each person  and their  ‘picture’ of the world, as determinative of belief or non- belief . It now becomes a matter not of membership in an organization, although not precluding that, belief being existential rather than defined as organizational. As an atheist, I grow very tired of the religious apologists, perhaps as Mr. Benthall is weary of ‘militant atheists’: Schleiermacher’s idea offers a ‘way’ an ‘approach’ that neutralizes, even assuages, my resentment, which can be a formidable obstacle to a rapprochement. But please don’t think that your assertion of your belief is going to stop my freely expressing my beliefs, as being as legitimate, as any believers. Does that make me a militant?