StephenKMackSD's Blog

How can an observer not surrender to a specific critical animus toward Cockeyed Platonist (CP), as he opines from his comfortable aerie at The New York Times, on the historic and moving events in Egypt? It is all so manageable in terms of rhetoric, while comfortably ensconced in the verities of an unapologetic American Exceptionalism. And its master frame of the natural superiority of ‘Western Thought’: forgetting that Muslim Scholars were custodians, protectors and commentators on those precious documents, long before ‘The West’ emancipated itself from a manifest authoritarian ‘religious’ regime, of its own making. Not relevant?

CP’s frame is the natural unsuitability, even, inferiority of Egypt as a whole: In education, in politics, in economics for democratic political change to be viable over time. He employs a mass of data in defense of his particularized political fatalism: Mr. Thomas Carothers essay ‘The End of the Transition Paradigm’ is cited, a seventeen page collection of data and analysis of a very interesting kind,  yet somehow not entirely relevant- but certainly buttressing the paternalism, the natural superiority of western thinking as guide and mentor to the lesser peoples of the earth.  Mr. Carothers is respectable academic and not blatant in the expression of paternalism, but it is unmistakable.

CP’s title is revelatory ‘The 40 % Nation’ I quote: ‘The quality of government agencies over all is a tad better. The World Bank Institute puts Egypt at around the 40th percentile when it comes to government effectiveness. It puts Egypt in the 50th percentile when it comes to the quality of regulations and rule of law. Where it really lags is in measures of responsiveness and accountability. Egypt’s government agencies are among the least responsive on earth.’ Is this conscious political self-parody? Is not one of the founding principles of Modern American Conservatism the central idea of ‘starving the beast’? Or is a necessary opportunism leading his argument and philosophical consistency be dammed?

As presented by CP, The World Bank Institute, U.N. Human Development Index, The World Economic Forum provide telling statistical data in reaffirming  the unsuitability of Egyptians to the aspiration of a workable, effective  democracy: to create a vital civic life.  Is this kind of political fatalism, backed with statistics, from a citizen of a country ranked as average, in its international educational achievement assessment, within the bounds of the credible? Are we correct in our reality based skepticism of this highly garnished argument? I am reminded of a quote from the critic John Simon regarding the fiction of Jacqueline Susanne, and I must rely on my recall: How much of this rotten stew must I eat before I know it is bad?   

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/06/opinion/06rich.html?ref=opinion

Here is Frank Rich cutting through the crap that is mainstream American Journalism, in this instance the revolution in the revolution.

How does one approach the arrogance, the unregenerate paternalism of the self-appointed ‘Policy Expert’ with all the qualifications needed to cow critics: the prestigious emeritus status bestowed by his fellow experts; is that  enough to render ‘serious’ criticism null set? Or are the emerging events of history, played out before our eyes, sufficient demonstration of failed policies and the bankruptcy of the notion of expertise, in the case of our ‘policy’ toward Egypt. Mr. Gelb continues to forcefully remind us of his status as ‘expert’ while we witness minute by minute the unraveling of what ‘expertise’ has wrought. Mr. Gelb manufactures neologisms by the handful to vent his anger at the democrats, who simply state the right of everyone to, at the least, assert their right to self-determination: the right, even the duty to make their own history, freeing themselves from tutelage, in the Kantian sense. But this cannot be tolerated when the Muslim Brotherhood is a part of the political equation: their presence is a threat to the carefully stage-managed ‘stability’ of ‘Middle East Policy’ as a, now, demonstrably failing set of policy imperatives. Mr. Gelb uses the usual fear-mongering, an American Tradition of long standing, to impugn the unmanageable, the seemingly inexplicable human desire for freedom and self-rule within the frame of a vital, energized civic republicanism- this is the point of our own political struggle, our own continuing attempts at achieving that laudable goal. The Egyptian People will struggle as we struggle, that is our common fate as Zoon Politikon.  When do we, as citizens and republicans, free ourselves from the self-serving, destructive notion of our political omniscience: it is too late for Mr. Gelb!           

            The Good Doctor (TGD) reminds us that he is an inveterate paternalist, if we ever could have entertained such a doubt. He is also given to breathtakingly reductionist historical snap-shots, arranged a la David Hockney, to produce a re-imagined view of the world and its occurrences in time: history.  But he reminds us that history must be made under the guiding, benevolent hand of American thinkers, like himself. That is, in sum, his argument illustrated by the telling example of the Iranian Revolution, i.e. Radical Islam. Although one could argue that the Greens of Iran represent a nascent yet suppressed, subjugated people just as the Egyptians once were. But we must move to the present moment in the Political Melodrama as constructed by TGD, our dramaturge. The dramatis personae being the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed ElBaradei and the Egyptian military: TGD being a Neo-Conservative, he cannot forgive Mr. ElBaradei’s sin of a lack of solidarity with the Weapons of Mass Destruction theology, of the lead-up to the Iraq War, although that remains unmentioned. The military are the key players in the drive for democracy and Mr. ElBaradei is a ‘menace’. This excerpt from Wikipedia is illustrative of the cause of TGD’s ill will toward Mr. ElBaradei:

‘One of the major issues during ElBaradei’s second term as the Director General of the IAEA was the Agency’s inspections in Iraq. ElBaradei disputed the US rationale for the 2003 invasion of Iraq from the time of the 2002 Iraq disarmament crisis, when he, along with Hans Blix, led a team of UN weapons inspectors in Iraq. ElBaradei told the UN Security Council in March 2003 that documents purporting to show that Iraq had tried to acquire uranium from Niger were not authentic.

ElBaradei described the U.S. invasion of Iraq as "a glaring example of how, in many cases, the use of force exacerbates the problem rather than solving it."^[13] ElBaradei further said "we learned from Iraq that an inspection takes time, that we should be patient, that an inspection can, in fact, work,"^[14] and that he had "been validated" in concluding that Saddam Hussein had not revived his nuclear weapons program.^[15]

In a 2004 op-ed piece on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, in the New York Times (February 12, 2004), ElBaradei stated "We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction, yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security – and indeed to continue to refine their capacities and postulate plans for their use."^[16] He went on to say "If the world does not change course, we risk self-destruction."

            Given this enlightening historical frame, is the hostility that TGD expresses toward Mr. ElBaradei in any way surprising, given the imperatives of his ideological politicking. For a thinker with no military experience, he seems to place an inordinate amount of faith in this one branch of civil society, as the engine of reform and peaceful change.  Is this faith misplaced?  Neither he nor I can answer that question, but it is worth pondering the question of an ascendant military, in a civil society struggling to realize a republican equilibrium.  TGD supplies no empirical evidence of the condition of other civic institutions, and their ability to perform their necessary functions, in a coordinated effort at remaking the Egyptian state.